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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 3, pp 709–732 | Cite as

Deference and Uniqueness

  • Christopher J. G. MeachamEmail author
Article
  • 146 Downloads

Abstract

Deference principles are principles that describe when, and to what extent, it’s rational to defer to others. Recently, some authors have used such principles to argue for Evidential Uniqueness, the claim that for every batch of evidence, there’s a unique doxastic state that it’s permissible for subjects with that total evidence to have. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to assess these deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness. I’ll show that these arguments only work given a particular kind of deference principle, and I’ll argue that there are reasons to reject these kinds of principles. The second aim of this paper is to spell out what a plausible generalized deference principle looks like. I’ll start by offering a principled rationale for taking deference to constrain rational belief. Then I’ll flesh out the kind of deference principle suggested by this rationale. Finally, I’ll show that this principle is both more plausible and more general than the principles used in the deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness.

Keywords

Uniqueness Deference Permissiveness Expert principle Deference principle Epistemic akrasia 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I’d like to thank Maya Eddon, Daniel Greco, Brian Hedden, Ben Levinstein, Alejandro Perez-Carballo, and Jonathan Vogel for helpful comments and discussion.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, E305 South CollegeUniversity of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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