Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 3, pp 839–851 | Cite as

Replies to Barrett, Corris and Chemero, and Hutto

  • Shaun GallagherEmail author


In this essay, I respond to the critical remarks of Louise Barrett, Amanda Corris and Anthony Chemero, and Daniel Hutto on my book Enactivist Interventions. In doing so, I consider whether behaviorism can make a contribution to enactivist theory, whether synergies are the same as dynamical gestalts, and whether the brain can add anything to mathematical reasoning.


Enactivism Behaviorism Synergy Mathematical reasoning 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of MemphisMemphisUSA
  2. 2.Faculty of Law, Humanities and the ArtsUniversity of WollongongWollongongAustralia

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