Is reality fundamentally qualitative?
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Individuals play a prominent role in many metaphysical theories. According to an individualistic metaphysics, reality is determined (at least in part) by the pattern of properties and relations that hold between individuals. A number of philosophers have recently brought to attention alternative views in which individuals do not play such a prominent role; in this paper I will investigate one of these alternatives.
KeywordsQualitative Haecceitism Nihilism Individuals
Thanks to: Jeremy Goodman, Cian Dorr, and to two anonymous referees for this journal for some very helpful feedback. Thanks also to the audience of Metaphysics on the Mountain 2017; thanks, in particular, to my commenter, Louis deRosset, who provided me with some great feedback and spotted several mistakes.
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