Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 1, pp 65–92 | Cite as

Dispositional and categorical properties, and Russellian Monism

  • Eric HiddlestonEmail author


This paper has two main aims. The first is to present a general approach for understanding “dispositional” (or “structural”) and “categorical” properties; the second aim is to use this approach to criticize Russellian Monism. On the approach I suggest, what are usually thought of as “dispositional” and “categorical” properties are really just the extreme ends of a spectrum of options. The approach allows for a number of options between these extremes, and it is plausible, I suggest, that just about everything of scientific interest falls in this middle ground. I argue that Russellian Monism depends for its plausibility on the unarticulated assumption that there are no properties in the middle ground.


Metaphysics Properties Dispositional properties Powers Philosophy of mind Russellian Monism 



Though it may not be obvious from the text, I am especially indebted to Sydney Shoemaker.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Wayne State UniversityDetroitUSA

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