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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 10, pp 2567–2582 | Cite as

Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can

  • Luis R. G. OliveiraEmail author
Article

Abstract

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism.

Keywords

Evidentialism Normative reasons Transparency Ought implies can 

Notes

Acknowledgements

For discussion and comments on previous drafts, I am grateful to Hilary Kornblith, Chris Meacham, Ernesto Garcia, Timothy Perrine, Kristian Olsen, Scott Hill, Ed Ferrier, Dennis Kavlakoglu, Josh DiPaolo, Emma McClure, Liz Jackson, and audiences at the University of Toronto and at the 2017 Eastern APA.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of HoustonHoustonUSA

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