Accommodation dynamics for comparing utilities with others
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In interactive situations, agents can “learn” something that is not a preexisting truth. They can converge to an arbitrary convention, or tacit agreement. Once established they may even view it as an objective truth. Here we investigate accommodation dynamics for interpersonal comparisons of utility intervals. We show, for a large class of dynamics, convergence to a convention.
KeywordsInterpersonal comparisons Utility Learning dynamics Convention
Research for this article was supported by Grant SMA-1416907 from National Science Foundation. We would like to thank Kent Johnson, Cailin O’Connor and Kevin Zollman for helpful comments.
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