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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 10, pp 2419–2427 | Cite as

Accommodation dynamics for comparing utilities with others

  • Louis Narens
  • Brian SkyrmsEmail author
Article
  • 201 Downloads

Abstract

In interactive situations, agents can “learn” something that is not a preexisting truth. They can converge to an arbitrary convention, or tacit agreement. Once established they may even view it as an objective truth. Here we investigate accommodation dynamics for interpersonal comparisons of utility intervals. We show, for a large class of dynamics, convergence to a convention.

Keywords

Interpersonal comparisons Utility Learning dynamics Convention 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Research for this article was supported by Grant SMA-1416907 from National Science Foundation. We would like to thank Kent Johnson, Cailin O’Connor and Kevin Zollman for helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Cognitive SciencesUniversity of California, IrvineIrvineUSA
  2. 2.Department of Logic and the Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of California, IrvineIrvineUSA
  3. 3.Department of PhilosophyStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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