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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 7, pp 1767–1786 | Cite as

Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View

  • Santiago Amaya
Article

Abstract

This paper defends a version of the Simple View, the claim that someone intentionally φs only if the person intends to φ. To do this, I raise a problem for Bratman’s classic argument (Bratman in Philos Rev 93(3):375–405; Intentions, plans, and practical reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1987) against it. The problem brings into focus an evaluative dimension behind the view, whose recognition allows for an improved version of it. With this improved version, I then go on to answer other criticisms that have been raised to it.

Keywords

Simple View Intentional action Goal intentions Implementation intentions Executive mistakes 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This paper benefited from conversations and written comments from many people, including John Brunero, Kim Haddix, Camilo Martínez, Al Mele, and Carlos Moya. As a referee for this journal, Andrei Buckareff provided a sharp and timely evaluation that made the revision process both challenging and helpful.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest

The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversidad de los AndesBogotáColombia

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