Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 7, pp 1703–1727 | Cite as

Knowledge-how is the norm of intention

  • Joshua Habgood-CooteEmail author


It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to support from arguments which parallel those for other epistemic norms, that it can deal with a number of prima facie problem cases, and that alternative conditions in a norm on intention are implausible.


Knowledge-how Epistemic norms Intention Partial plans Bratman 



Thanks to: Dylan Bianchi, Jessica Brown, Niel Conradie, Nilanjan Das, Philip Ebert, Rachel Fraser, Abby Jacques, Brendan de Kenessey, Katherine Hawley, Matthew McGrath, Sarah Paul, Carlotta Pavese, Ginger Schultheis, Kieran Setiya, Justin Snedegar, Eric Swanson, Caroline Touborg, Michael Wheeler, Quinn White, Marissa Wallin, an anonymous reviewer for this journal, and audiences in St Andrews, MIT, and Valladolid.


Funding was provided by Arts and Humanities Research Council (GB).


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of St AndrewsFifeUK

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