A reply to Fine’s critique of Aboutness. Fine contrasts two notions of truthmaker, and more generally two notions of “state.” One is algebraic; states are sui generis entities grasped primarily through the conditions they satisfy. The other uses set theory; states are sets of worlds, or, perhaps, collections of such sets. I try to defend the second notion and question some seeming advantages of the first.
KeywordsMeaning Truth Metaphysics Intentionality Propositions
I am grateful to the participants in a workshop on the book held in the Summer of 2015 at the University of Hamburg—especially Ken Gemes, Mark Jago, Daniel Rothschild, Katharina Felka, Stephan Kraemer, Benjamin Schnieder, Robert Schwartzkopff, and Kit Fine. Enormous additional thanks to Kit for his hospitality to a sometimes straggling fellow traveler.
- Fine, K. (1975). Review of Lewis. Counterfactuals Mind, 84(451), 8.Google Scholar
- Fine, K. (2013). Truth-maker semantics for intuitionistic logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43, 1–29.Google Scholar
- Fine, K. (2016). Constructing the impossible. In L. Walters, & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conditionals, probability, and paradox: Themes from the philosophy of Dorothy Edgington. Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
- Humberstone, I. L. (1981). From worlds to possibilities. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10:313–340, Ag 81 1981. English.Google Scholar
- Kratzer, A. (2010). Situations in natural language semantics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford, CA: CSLI, Stanford University.Google Scholar
- Lewis, D. (1988). Statements partly about observation. In Papers in philosophical logic. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar