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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 6, pp 1467–1476 | Cite as

Secondary belief content, what is it good for?

  • Alexander SandgrenEmail author
Article

Abstract

Some use the need to explain communication, agreement, and disagreement to argue for two-dimensional conceptions of belief content. One prominent defender of an account of this sort is David Chalmers. Chalmers claims that beliefs have two kinds of content. The second dimension of belief content, which is tied to what beliefs pick out in the actual world, is supposed to help explain communication, agreement, and dis agreement. I argue that it does not. Since the need to explain these phenomena is the main stated motivation for the addition of the second dimension of belief content, my arguments also undermine the motivation for Chalmers’ two-dimensional account of belief content and theories like it.

Keywords

Mental content Two-dimensionalism David Chalmers Reference 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Daniel Nolan, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Alan Hájek, Clare Due, Erick Llamas, Daniel Stoljar, Luke Roelofs, Melissa Ebbers, Philip Pettit, Ben Blumson, Donald Nordblom, and an audience at the 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy conference at Monash University for helpful discussion about the material in this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of PhilosophyAustralian National UniversityCanberraAustralia

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