Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 9, pp 2397–2414 | Cite as

Replies to Commentators

  • Lara BuchakEmail author


I reply to two commentaries—one by Johanna Thoma and Jonathan Weisberg and one by James M. Joyce—concerning how risk-weighted expected utility theory handles the Allais preferences and Dutch books.


Decision theory Risk Risk-weighted expected utility Rank dependence Allais paradox Dutch books 


  1. Abdellaoui, M., Barrios, C., & Wakker, P. (2007). Reconciling introspective utility with revealed preferences: Experimental arguments based on prospect theory. Journal of Economics, 138, 356–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Briggs, R. (2015). Costs of abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(5–6), 827–840.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Buchak, L. (2013). Risk and rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Buchak, L. (2015). Revisiting risk and rationality: A reply to Pettigrew and Briggs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(5–6), 841–862.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Camerer, C. F. (1989). An experimental test of several generalized utility theories. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, 61–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Joyce, J. (2017). Commentary on Lara Buchak’s Risk and Rationality. doi: 10.1007/s11098-017-0905-6.
  7. MacCrimmon, K. R. (1968). Descriptive and normative implications of decision theory. In K. Borch & J. Mossin (Eds.), Risk and uncertainty (pp. 3–23). New York: St. Martin’s Press.Google Scholar
  8. MacCrimmon, K. R., & Larsson, S. (1979). Utility theory: Axioms versus “paradoxes”. In M. Allais & O. Hagen (Eds.), Expected utility and the allais paradox. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
  9. Machina, M. (1987). Choice under uncertainty: Problems solved and unsolved. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(1), 121–154.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Moskowitz, H. (1974). Effects of problem representation and feedback on rational behavior in Allais and Morlat-Type Problems. Decision Sciences, 5, 225–242.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Oliver, A. (2003). A quantitative and qualitative test of the Allais paradox using health outcomes. Journal of Economic Psychology, 24, 35–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Savage, L. (1954). Foundations of statistics. Dover: John Wiley and Sons.Google Scholar
  13. Schmidt, U. (2004a). Alternatives to expected utility: Formal theories. In S. Barberà, P. J. Hammond, & C. Seidl (Eds.), Chapter 15 of handbook of utility theory (pp. 757–837). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Schmidt, U. (2004b). Alternatives to expected utility: Foundations. In S. Barberà, P. J. Hammond, & C. Seidl (Eds.), Chapter 14 of handbook of utility theory (pp. 685–755). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  15. Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1974). Who accepts Savage’s axiom? Behavioral Science, 19(6), 368–373.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Starmer, C. (2000). Developments in non-expected utility theory: The hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 332–382.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Thoma, J., & Weisberg, J. (2017). Risk writ large. doi: 10.1007/s11098-017-0906-5.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

Personalised recommendations