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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 2, pp 429–447 | Cite as

Aesthetic virtues: traits and faculties

  • Tom RobertsEmail author
Article

Abstract

Two varieties of aesthetic virtue are distinguished. Trait virtues are features of the agent’s character, and reflect an overarching concern for aesthetic goods such as beauty and novelty, while faculty virtues are excellences of artistic execution that permit the agent to succeed in her chosen domain. The distinction makes possible a fuller account of why art matters to us—it matters not only insofar as it is aesthetically good, but also in its capacity as an achievement that is creditable to an individual, and as a reflection or embodiment of virtuous motives.

Keywords

Aesthetics Virtue Character Art 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Sociology, Philosophy, and AnthropologyUniversity of ExeterExeterUK

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