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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 12, pp 3097–3108 | Cite as

Actual utility, the mismatch problem, and the move to expected utility

  • Robert GruberEmail author
Article
  • 329 Downloads

Abstract

The mismatch problem for consequentialism arises whenever the theory delivers mismatched verdicts between a group act and the individual acts that compose it. A natural thought is that moving to expected utility versions of consequentialism will solve this problem. I explain why the move to expected utility is not successful.

Keywords

Consequentialism Expected utility Collective action 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I’d like to thank the audiences at graduate conferences at the University of Utah and Syracuse University for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. I’d also like to thank participants in the UMass dissertation seminar. For their help with this version of the paper, special thanks goes to Christopher Meacham, Peter Graham, Tricia Magalotti, Miles Tucker, Luis Oliveira, and Scott Hill. I’m especially grateful to Fred Feldman for his invaluable help on this project.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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