Actual utility, the mismatch problem, and the move to expected utility
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The mismatch problem for consequentialism arises whenever the theory delivers mismatched verdicts between a group act and the individual acts that compose it. A natural thought is that moving to expected utility versions of consequentialism will solve this problem. I explain why the move to expected utility is not successful.
KeywordsConsequentialism Expected utility Collective action
I’d like to thank the audiences at graduate conferences at the University of Utah and Syracuse University for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. I’d also like to thank participants in the UMass dissertation seminar. For their help with this version of the paper, special thanks goes to Christopher Meacham, Peter Graham, Tricia Magalotti, Miles Tucker, Luis Oliveira, and Scott Hill. I’m especially grateful to Fred Feldman for his invaluable help on this project.
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