Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 7, pp 1675–1686 | Cite as

Intuitions and objects in Allais’s manifest reality

  • Karl SchaferEmail author


Manifest reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant’s transcendental idealism. So there is a great deal in Allais’s discussion to celebrate. But I want to focus here on two aspects of her views that I am not yet sure about: First, Allais’s understanding of the relationship between concepts and intuitions. And second, her characterization of the manner in which intuitions are object-dependent. I’ll close by making some general remarks about the significance of this for Allais’s understanding of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism.


Kant Lucy Allais Transcendental idealism Concepts Intuitions Cognition 



Thanks, first of all, to Lucy Allais for a wonderful book. Thanks also to the audience and fellow panelists at our session at the Pacific APA, and to Sean Greenberg, Colin McLear, Nick Stang, Andrew Stephenson for helpful comments and discussion.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of CaliforniaIrvineUSA

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