Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 9, pp 2315–2328 | Cite as

Our animal interests

Article

Abstract

Animalism is at once a bold metaphysical theory and a pedestrian biological observation. For according to animalists, human persons are organisms; we are members of a certain biological species. In this article, I introduce some heretofore unnoticed data concerning the interlocking interests of human persons and human organisms. I then show that the data support animalism. The result is a novel and powerful argument for animalism. Bold or pedestrian, animalism is true.

Keywords

Animalism Personal ontology Personal identity Metaphysics Philosophy of mind 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yale-NUS CollegeSingaporeSingapore

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