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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 10, pp 2449–2465 | Cite as

Social construction as grounding; or: fundamentality for feminists, a reply to Barnes and Mikkola

  • Jonathan SchafferEmail author
Article

Abstract

Feminist metaphysics is guided by the insight that gender is socially constructed, yet the metaphysics behind social construction remains obscure. Barnes and Mikkola charge that current metaphysical frameworks—including my grounding framework—are hostile to feminist metaphysics. I argue that not only is a grounding framework hospitable to feminist metaphysics, but also that a grounding framework can help shed light on the metaphysics behind social construction. By treating social construction claims as grounding claims, the feminist metaphysician and the social ontologist both gain a way to integrate social construction claims into a general metaphysics, while accounting for the inferential connections between social construction and attendant notions such as dependence and explanation. So I conclude that a grounding framework can be helpful for feminist metaphysics and social ontology.

Keywords

Feminist metaphysics Social construction Grounding Gender 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

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