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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 10, pp 2585–2597 | Cite as

How central are judgment and agency to epistemology?

  • Hilary KornblithEmail author
Article

Abstract

Ernest Sosa’s Judgment and Agency marks an important change from his earlier work in epistemology. While belief was at the center of his earlier approach to epistemological issues, a far more sophisticated mental state, judgment, plays the central role here. This paper examines the significance of this change in focus, and argues that there is reason to favor the earlier belief-centered approach over this new judgment-centered account.

Keywords

Sosa Judgment Agency AAA structure Metacognition 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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