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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 10, pp 2613–2628 | Cite as

Morality is necessary for happiness

  • Paul BloomfieldEmail author
Article

Abstract

An argument for the eponymous conclusion is given through a series of hypothetical syllogisms, the most basic of which is as follows: morality is necessary for self-respect; self-respect is necessary for happiness; therefore, morality is necessary for happiness. Some of the most obvious objections are entertained and rejected.

Keywords

Morality Well-being Happiness Egoism Self-interest Self-respect Respect 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUConnStorrsUSA

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