Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 4, pp 877–886 | Cite as

Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning

  • Cristina Borgoni
  • Yannig LuthraEmail author


There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain the possibility of epistemic akrasia.


Epistemic akrasia Critical epistemic reasoning Mental agency Fallibility 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GrazGrazAustria
  2. 2.University of California Los AngelesLos AngelesUSA

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