No need to know
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I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
KeywordsValue of knowledge Knowledge Position to know Dispositional belief Memory
For helpful comments and conversation I thank Earl Conee, Brian Cutter, Trent Dougherty, John Greco, Jon Kvanvig, Jon Matheson, Kevin McCain, Andrew Moon, an anonymous referee, and an audience at the 2015 Southern Epistemology Conference. I wrote this paper while supported by a grant from the Templeton Religious Trust. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Religious Trust.
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