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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 2, pp 391–401 | Cite as

No need to know

  • Matthew FriseEmail author
Article
  • 359 Downloads

Abstract

I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.

Keywords

Value of knowledge Knowledge Position to know Dispositional belief Memory 

Notes

Acknowledgments

For helpful comments and conversation I thank Earl Conee, Brian Cutter, Trent Dougherty, John Greco, Jon Kvanvig, Jon Matheson, Kevin McCain, Andrew Moon, an anonymous referee, and an audience at the 2015 Southern Epistemology Conference. I wrote this paper while supported by a grant from the Templeton Religious Trust. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Religious Trust.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBaylor UniversityWacoUSA

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