Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 12, pp 3231–3233 | Cite as

Reply to Eaton and Pickavance

Article

Abstract

David Eaton and Timothy Pickavance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles (such as Gettier cases) must have.

Keywords

Knowledge Interests Gettier cases 

References

  1. Eaton, D., & Pickavance, T. (2015). Evidence against pragmatic encroachment. Philosophical Studies, 172, 3135–3143. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0461-x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  4. Weatherson, B. (2014). Probability and scepticism. In D. Dodd & E. Zardini (Eds.), Scepticism and perceptual justification (pp. 71–86). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Michigan, Ann ArborAnn ArborUSA
  2. 2.ArchéUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsUK

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