Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 12, pp 3223–3229 | Cite as

On the generality of experience: a reply to French and Gomes

  • Neil MehtaEmail author
  • Todd Ganson


According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta (J Philos 111:311–331, 2014) criticizes this view, and French and Gomes (Philos Stud 173(2):451–460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta’s criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta’s original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta’s arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character.


Phenomenal particularism Phenomenal generalism Phenomenal character Naive realism Particularity of experience 


  1. Campbell, J. (2011). Relational vs. Kantian responses to Berkeley’s puzzle. In J. Roessler, H. Lerman, & N. Eilan (Eds.), Perception, causation, and objectivity (pp. 35–50). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. French, C., & Gomes, A. (2016). On the particularity of experience. Philosophical Studies, 173(2), 451–460.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Hume, D. (2000). A treatise of human nature. Eds. D. & M. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Mehta, N. (2014). The limited role of particulars in phenomenal experience. Journal of Philosophy, 111, 311–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Schwitzgebel, E. (2011). Perplexities of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  6. Williamson, T. (2001). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yale-NUS CollegeSingaporeSingapore
  2. 2.Oberlin CollegeOberlinUSA

Personalised recommendations