Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 8, pp 2215–2231 | Cite as

Multiple location defended

  • Antony Eagle


The notion of multiple location plays an important role in the characterization of endurantism. Several authors have recently offered cases intended to demonstrate the incoherence of multiple location. I argue that these cases do not succeed in making multiple location problematic. Along the way, several crucial issues about multiple location and its use by endurantists are clarified.


Persistence Endurance Multiple location Extension Time-travel Mereology Recombination principle Fundamental relations 



This paper began to be as a section of another still in-progress paper; for comments on that larger paper that may have influenced this paper, I’m grateful to these people in particular: Rachael Briggs, Garrett Cullity, Shamik Dasgupta, Cian Dorr, Cody Gilmore, Dana Goswick, Benj Hellie, Peter van Inwagen, Jonathan McKeown-Green, Graham Nerlich, Daniel Nolan, Josh Parsons, Laurie Paul, Olly Pooley, Denis Robinson, Ted Sider, Gabriel Uzquiano, and Jessica Wilson. Thanks also to anonymous referees for their comments.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest

The author declares that they have no conflict of interest.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AdelaideAdelaideAustralia

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