Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 5, pp 1335–1359 | Cite as

Three kinds of worlds and two kinds of truth

Article
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Abstract

This paper argues for three kinds of possible worlds: Wittgensteinian totalities of facts, Lewisian worlds or universes, concrete objects of maximal essence, and the world, a concrete object of minimal essence. It moreover explains that correspondence truth applies to Wittgensteinian totalities and pragmatic truth to Lewisian universes. And it finally argues that this conceptualization lays proper foundations to two-dimensional semantics.

Keywords

Possible worlds Metaphyiscal possiblity Epistemic possibility Correspondence truth Pragmatic truth Essentialism Two-dimensional semantics 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Michael De for checking my English and various helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of KonstanzConstanceGermany

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