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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 2, pp 451–460 | Cite as

On the particularity of experience

  • Anil Gomes
  • Craig French
Article

Abstract

Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character.

Keywords

Perception Particularity of perception Naïve realism Relationalism Experience Phenomenal Character 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Trinity CollegeOxfordUK
  2. 2.Trinity HallCambridgeUK

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