Philosophical Studies

, Volume 172, Issue 12, pp 3135–3143 | Cite as

Evidence against pragmatic encroachment



We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that p only if one’s epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the consequence we find problematic is not, in fact, problematic.


Pragmatic encroachment Evidence Practical adequacy 


  1. Anderson, C., & Hawthorne, J. (forthcoming). Knowledge, practical adequacy, and stakes. In Gendler, T.S., & Hawthorne, J. (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology.Google Scholar
  2. DeRose, K. (2009). The case for contextualism. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2002). Evidence, pragmatics, and justification. The Philosophical Review, 111(1), 67–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an uncertain world. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Pryor, J. (2004). What’s wrong with Moore’s argument? Philosophical Issues, 14, 349–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Schroeder, M. (2012). Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 160(2), 265–285.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA
  2. 2.Biola UniversityLa MiradaUSA

Personalised recommendations