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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 1, pp 49–100 | Cite as

Grounding in the image of causation

  • Jonathan SchafferEmail author
Article

Abstract

Grounding is often glossed as metaphysical causation, yet no current theory of grounding looks remotely like a plausible treatment of causation. I propose to take the analogy between grounding and causation seriously, by providing an account of grounding in the image of causation, on the template of structural equation models for causation.

Keywords

Metaphysics Grounding Fundamentality Explanation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This paper supersedes earlier work appearing in manuscript under the titles of “Grounding as the Primitive Concept of Metaphysical Structure” and “Structural Equation Models of Ground.” My thanks especially to Karen Bennett, David Chalmers, Fabrice Correia, Shamik Dasgupta, Louis DeRosset, Janelle Derstine, Kit Fine, Ned Hall, Christopher Hitchcock, Thomas Hofweber, Thomas Kivatinos, Kathrin Koslicki, Lisa Miracchi, L. A. Paul, Michael Raven, Gideon Rosen, Raul Saucedo, Benjamin Schnieder, Theodore Sider, Alex Skiles, Kelly Trogdon, Tobias Wilsch, Alastair Wilson, Jessica Wilson, and audiences at the Australian National University, Birmingham, Bristol, Fordham, Geneva (Eidos), Manchester, Notre Dame, Princeton, Vermont, Washington University, the Colorado Conference on Dependence, Metaphysical Mayhem at Rutgers, the Epistemology of Philosophy Conference in Cologne, the Central APA, the Metaphysics Reading Group at Rutgers, and the Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy.

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyRutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

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