Philosophical Studies

, Volume 172, Issue 7, pp 1833–1846

What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0394-9

Cite this article as:
Sebastián, M.Á. Philos Stud (2015) 172: 1833. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0394-9


Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same (sufficiently) fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles to give up on the other.


Panpsychism Russellian Monism Organizational Invariantism Conceivability Consciousness Chalmers 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Instituto de Investigaciones FilosóficasUNAMMexico CityMexico

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