What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism
Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same (sufficiently) fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles to give up on the other.
KeywordsPanpsychism Russellian Monism Organizational Invariantism Conceivability Consciousness Chalmers
I am deeply grateful to Axel Barceló, David Chalmers, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Eduardo García- Ramirez, Ekain Garmendia and Erick Llamas for useful discussion and comments on this paper. This paper was presented in the 5th Consciousness Online Conference (CO5) and at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Unidad Iztapalapa. I am very grateful to the audience of these events, and very especially to Richard Brown, David Chalmers, Philipp Goff, Hedda Hassel, Jorge Ornelas, Adam Pautz and Jonathan Simon for their detailed and thoughtful comments and discussion. Financial support for this work was provided by Conacyt (research project 166502), and the postdoctoral fellowship program in the UNAM.
- Block, N. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 9, 261–325.Google Scholar
- Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 481–548.Google Scholar
- Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory (1st ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Chalmers, D. J. (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility? In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and Possibility (pp. 145–200). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Chalmers, D. J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature. In S. P. Stich & T. A. Wareld (Eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
- Chalmers, D. J. (2009). The Two-Dimensional argument against materialism. In B. P. McLaughlin & S. Walter (Eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. London: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained (1st ed.). Bostan: Back Bay Books.Google Scholar
- Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354–361. (October).Google Scholar
- Lewis, D. (1990). What experience teaches. In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and Cognition (pp. 29–57). Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
- Pollock, J., & Cruz, J. (1999). Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Towota, NJ: Rowman and Little eld Publishers.Google Scholar