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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 172, Issue 7, pp 1889–1906 | Cite as

The concept horse with no name

  • Robert TruemanEmail author
Article

Abstract

In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful.

Keywords

The concept horse paradox Frege Wright The reference principle Properties 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Arif Ahmed, Daniel Brigham, Tim Button, Tim Crane, Owen Griffiths, Adrian Haddock, Bob Hale, Luca Incurvati, Colin Johnston, Fraser MacBride, Steven Methven, Michael Potter, Agustín Rayo, Lukas Skiba, Peter Sullivan, Nathan Wildman, Crispin Wright, Adam Stewart-Wallace and an anonymous referee. Thanks also to the Analysis Trust for their studentship, during which part of this paper was written.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of StirlingStirlingUK

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