What is the Bare Particular Theory? Is it committed, like the Bundle Theory, to a constituent ontology: according to which a substance’s qualities—and according to the Bare Particular Theory, its substratum also—are proper parts of the substance? I argue that Bare Particularists need not, should not, and—if a recent objection to ‘the Bare Particular Theory’ (Andrew Bailey’s ‘New Objection’) succeeds—cannot endorse a constituent ontology. There is nothing, I show, in the motivations for Bare Particularism or the principles that distinguish Bare Particularism from rival views that entails a constituent ontology. I outline a version of Bare Particularism that in rejecting a constituent ontology avoids the New Objection. I argue against Theodore Sider that this really is a distinct theory to the version of Bare Particularism that endorses a constituent ontology, and not a mere terminological variant. I show that this, the best version of the Bare Particular Theory, is also defensible against the old objections.
KeywordsBare Particulars Substratum Bundle Theory
I would like to thank Nathan Wildman, Christopher Buckels, James Levine, Antti Kauppinen, Meredith Plug and an anonymous Philosophical Studies referee for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Fiona Macpherson, Peter Simons, Markus Schlosser, James O'Shea and participants at the IPC conference in Drogheda 2014 for helpful questions and suggestions.
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