Abstract
Kit Fine has replied to my criticism of a technical objection he had given to the version of Millianism that I advocate. Fine evidently objects to my use of classical existential instantiation (EI) in an object-theoretic rendering of his meta-proof. Fine’s reply appears to involve both an egregious misreading of my criticism and a significant logical error. I argue that my rendering is unimpeachable, that the issue over my use of classical EI is a red herring, and that Fine’s original argument commits the straw-man fallacy. I argue further that contrary to Fine’s gratuitous attribution, what Kripke’s Pierre lacks and a typical bilingual has is not knowledge (“possession”) of a “manifest-making” (in fact, spectacularly false) premise, but the capacity to recognize London when it is differently designated. Fine’s argument refutes a preposterous theory no one advocates while leaving standard Millianism unscathed. The failure of his argument threatens to render Fine’s central notion of “coordination” redundant or empty.
Keywords
Kit fine Kripke Pierre Manifest Straw manNotes
Acknowledgements
I owe thanks to Philip Atkins, Daniel Kwon, Teresa Robertson, Max Weiss, and the Santa Barbarians for discussion; and to an anonymous referee and apologist for Kit Fine for providing comments that, although hostile, helpfully fill some critical gaps in Fine’s published positions. I am especially grateful to the late Donald Kalish, who was a brilliant thinker and a generous and superb teacher, and who is responsible for most of my knowledge about existential instantiation.
References
- Church, A. (1983). Entry on ‘logistic system’. In D. D. Runes (Ed.), The standard dictionary of philosophy (pp. 198–199). New York: Philosophical Library.Google Scholar
- Fine, K. (2007). Semantic relationism. Oxford: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Fine, K. (2014) Recurrence: A rejoinder. Philosophical Studies. doi: 10.1007/s11098-013-0189-4.
- Kripke, S. (2007) A Puzzle about Belief. Reprinted in On Sense and Direct Reference, pp. 1002–1036 by M. Davidson, ed., 2007, Boston: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
- Salmon, N. (2012). Recurrence. Philosophical Studies, 159, 407–441.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Weiss, M. (2014) A closer look at manifest consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic. doi: 10.1007/s10992-013-9269-3.