A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences
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Adam Elga (Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(5), 1–11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga’s argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle that is more difficult for imprecise Bayesians to avoid.
KeywordsFormal epistemology Decision theory Imprecise credences
This paper has benefited greatly from conversations and comments from many friends and teachers. Thanks to Harjit Bhogal, Rachel Briggs, Lara Buchak, Tom Dougherty, James Joyce, Jason Konek, Leon Leontyev, Miquel Miralbes Del Pino, Miriam Schoenfield, Daniel Singer, Eric Swanson, and Brett Topey. Special thanks to Seamus Bradley, Dmitri Gallow, Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Joshua Schechter, Sarah Moss, and Brian Weatherson. I am also grateful to audiences at the 2012 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, the 2012 Brown University Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference, the University of Pennsylvania and, especially, to participants of the Fifth Formal Epistemology Festival and the 2013 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference.
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