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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 170, Issue 2, pp 277–287 | Cite as

Knowing against the odds

  • Cian Dorr
  • Jeremy Goodman
  • John Hawthorne
Article

Abstract

We present and discuss a counterexample to the following plausible principle: if you know that a coin is fair, and for all you know it is going to be flipped, then for all you know it will land tails.

Keywords

Knowledge Chance Skepticism 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Andrew Bacon, Stewart Cohen, Jane Friedman, Peter Fritz, Harvey Lederman, Jeff Russell, and Timothy Williamson, and to the participants in a workshop at All Souls College and seminars in Oxford and Princeton.

References

  1. Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Hawthorne, J., & Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2009). Knowledge and objective chance. In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on knowledge (pp. 92–108). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs, 34, 517–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  5. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Williamson, T. (2009). Reply to John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio. In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on knowledge (pp. 313–329). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.New York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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