We present and discuss a counterexample to the following plausible principle: if you know that a coin is fair, and for all you know it is going to be flipped, then for all you know it will land tails.
KeywordsKnowledge Chance Skepticism
Thanks to Andrew Bacon, Stewart Cohen, Jane Friedman, Peter Fritz, Harvey Lederman, Jeff Russell, and Timothy Williamson, and to the participants in a workshop at All Souls College and seminars in Oxford and Princeton.
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