Philosophical Studies

, Volume 169, Issue 2, pp 333–338 | Cite as

Consistency and evidence

  • Nick HughesEmail author


Williamson (2000) appeals to considerations about when it is natural to say that a hypothesis is consistent with one’s evidence in order to motivate the claim that all and only knowledge is evidence. It is argued here that the relevant considerations do not support this claim, and in fact conflict with it.


Knowledge Evidence E=K Timothy Williamson Gettier 



Thanks to Herman Cappelen, Jessica Brown, Aidan McGlynn, Robin McKenna, Sebastian Becker, Andrew Peet, Bruno Jacinto, Michael Hannon, and audiences at the Arche Epistemology Seminar, the University of Edinburgh Epistemology Graduate Conference, and the University of Manchester Open Minds VIII Conference, for helpful comments and feedback on earlier versions of this paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and EpistemologyThe University of St AndrewsSt Andrews, FifeScotland

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