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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 168, Issue 2, pp 371–395 | Cite as

Indefinites and intentional identity

Article

Abstract

This paper investigates the truth conditions of sentences containing indefinite noun phrases, focusing on occurrences in attitude reports, and, in particular, a puzzle case due to Walter Edelberg. It is argued that indefinites semantically contribute the (thought-)object they denote, in a manner analogous to attributive definite descriptions. While there is an existential reading of attitude reports containing indefinites, it is argued that the existential quantifier is contributed by the de re interpretation of the indefinite (as the de re reading adds existential quantification to the interpretation of definites on Kaplan’s analysis).

Keywords

Indefinites Intentional identity Attitude reports Truth conditions Referential/attributive de re/de dicto 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California, Los AngelesLos AngelesUSA

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