Knowledge and suberogatory assertion
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I accomplish two things in this paper. First I expose some important limitations of the contemporary literature on the norms of assertion and in the process illuminate a host of new directions and forms that an account of assertional norms might take. Second I leverage those insights to suggest a new account of the relationship between knowledge and assertion, which arguably outperforms the standard knowledge account.
KeywordsKnowledge Assertion Norms Suberogation Rules
For helpful feedback and conversation, I thank an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies, Matt Benton, Mathieu Doucet, Tim Kenyon, Patricia Marino, Rachel McKinnon, Ernest Sosa, and Angelo Turri. Thanks also to audiences at Ryerson University, the 2012 Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association, and the 2012 Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop. This research was kindly supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the British Academy, the Association of Commonwealth Universities, the National Endowment for the Humanities, The Character Project at Wake Forest University and the John Templeton Foundation (neither of which necessarily endorses any opinion expressed here), and an Ontario Early Researcher Award.
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