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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 164, Issue 1, pp 127–139 | Cite as

The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle

  • Adam Elga
Article

Abstract

The “puzzle of the unmarked clock” derives from a conflict between the following: (1) a plausible principle of epistemic modesty, and (2) “Rational Reflection”, a principle saying how one’s beliefs about what it is rational to believe constrain the rest of one’s beliefs. An independently motivated improvement to Rational Reflection preserves its spirit while resolving the conflict.

Keywords

Reflection principle Externalism Christensen Williamson Luminosity Rationality Epistemic modesty Bayesianism Epistemic akrasia 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to David Christensen, Paulina Sliwa, Sophie Horowitz, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Michael Titelbaum, Jenann Ismael, participants in the 2011 Brown Epistemology workshop, the Corridor Group, the Princeton Formal Epistemology reading group, and the 2012 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, an audience at Stanford University, and especially Joshua Schechter.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Princeton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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