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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 167, Issue 2, pp 313–326 | Cite as

Horgan and Tienson on phenomenology and intentionality

  • Andrew Bailey
  • Bradley RichardsEmail author
Article

Abstract

Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content/fixer of truth conditions.

Keywords

Phenomenology Intentionality Phenomenal character Consciousness Perception 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This paper benefited from discussions with David Bourget and Ben Blumson regarding early drafts. Audience members at the Australian National University also provided valuable feedback on an earlier version of the paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of GuelphGuelphCanada

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