Philosophical Studies

, Volume 162, Issue 1, pp 1–12

Visual experience of natural kind properties: is there any fact of the matter?

Article

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LeedsLeedsUK

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