Philosophical Studies

, Volume 165, Issue 3, pp 831–839 | Cite as

Lepore and Ludwig on ‘explicit meaning theories’

  • Miguel Hoeltje


The fundamental problem proponents of truth conditional semantics must face is to specify what role a truth theory is supposed to play within a meaning theory. The most detailed proposal for tackling this problem is the account developed by Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig. However, as I will show in this paper, theories along the lines of Lepore and Ludwig do not suffice to put someone into the position to understand the objectlanguage. The fundamental problem of truth conditional semantics thus remains unsolved.


Donald Davidson Truth-theoretic semantics Meaning Meaning theories Ernest Lepore Kirk Ludwig 



For discussion and helpful comments I would like to thank Lars Dänzer, Nick Haverkamp, Kirk Ludwig, Benjamin Schnieder, Moritz Schulz, Alex Steinberg, and an anonymous referee.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für Philosophie, Fakultät für GeisteswissenschaftenUniversität Duisburg-EssenEssenGermany

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