Philosophical Studies

, Volume 164, Issue 2, pp 393–404 | Cite as

Monsters in Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives

  • Brian Rabern


Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character—such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan’s formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain monsters. For similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable binding is argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic theory and content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian thesis that “directly referential” terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric content of their operands, we must distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett 1973; Evans 1979; Stanley 1997), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic shift that differs from the other types, it is plausible to think that indexicals—which are standardly treated by means of the assignment function—might undergo the same kind of shift.


Monsters Variables Binding Quantifiers Lambda binders Logic of demonstratives Direct reference Assignment function Ingredient sense What is said Bound pronouns Semantics Compositionality Kaplan 



For helpful comments on earlier drafts thanks to David Chalmers, John Cusbert, Karen Lewis, Daniel Nolan, Jim Pryor, Landon Rabern, Paolo Santorio, Wolfgang Schwarz, Clas Weber, and an anonymous referee.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Australian National UniversityCanberraAustralia

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