Visual prominence and representationalism
- 302 Downloads
A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.
KeywordsAttention Representationalism Determinacy of representation Visual prominence
Special thanks to Neil Mehta and an anonymous reviewer for insightful comments. Thanks also to Benj Hellie for useful comments on an antecedent to this paper.
- Burge, T. (2010). Origins of objectivity. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Carrasco, M., & Yeshurun, Y. (2009). Covert attention effects on spatial resolution. Progress in Brain Research, 176, 65–86.Google Scholar
- Klein, C. (2007). An imperative theory of pain. The Journal of Philosophy, 104, 517–532.Google Scholar
- Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Prinzmetal, W., & Landau, A. N. (2010). Dissecting spatial visual attention. In V. Coltheart (Ed.), Tutorials in visual cognition (pp. 43–66). Hove: Psychology Press.Google Scholar
- Smithies, D. (2011). What is the role of consciousness in demonstrative thought? The Journal of Philosophy, 108, 5–34.Google Scholar
- Tumulty, M. (2009). Pains, imperatives, and intentionalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 106, 161–166.Google Scholar