Philosophical Studies

, Volume 167, Issue 2, pp 221–235 | Cite as

What is a reason to act?

  • Kieran Setiya


Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, “ought,” and evidence.


Action Advice Ought Reasons Reasoning Evidence 



For discussion of these topics, I am grateful to Samuel Asarnow, Jonathan Dancy, Cian Dorr, Alida Liberman, Richard Moran, Joseph Raz, Michael Smith, Jonathan Way, and Ralph Wedgwood; a reader for the journal gave very helpful comments on earlier drafts.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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