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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 166, Issue 2, pp 419–427 | Cite as

Worldmates and internal relatedness

  • Richard Woodward
Article

Abstract

In recent work, Jonathan Schaffer (Mind 119: 341–376, 2010) has attempted to argue that counterpart theorists are committed to holding that any two actual objects are bound together in a modally substantial sense. By clarifying the core elements of counterpart theory, I explain why Schaffer’s argument fails.

Keywords

Actual World Concrete Object Logical Space Modal Language Modal Profile 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

With thanks to Ross Cameron and Tatjana von Solodkoff. My research on this paper was partially supported by my involvement in the Nature of Assertion: Consequences for Relativism and Fictionalism project (FFI2010-169049), the Vagueness and Physics, Metaphysics, and MetaMetaphysics project (FFI2008-06153), and the Persp-Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts project (CSD2009-00056). Many thanks to the DGI, MICINN, and the Spanish Government for supporting these projects.

References

  1. Lewis, D. (1968). Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic. Journal of Philosophy, 65, 26–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  3. Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Schaffer, J. (2010). The internal relatedness of all things. Mind, 119, 341–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LOGOS: Grup de Recerca en Lògica, Llenguatge i Cognició, Facultat de FilosofiaUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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