Worldmates and internal relatedness
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In recent work, Jonathan Schaffer (Mind 119: 341–376, 2010) has attempted to argue that counterpart theorists are committed to holding that any two actual objects are bound together in a modally substantial sense. By clarifying the core elements of counterpart theory, I explain why Schaffer’s argument fails.
KeywordsActual World Concrete Object Logical Space Modal Language Modal Profile
With thanks to Ross Cameron and Tatjana von Solodkoff. My research on this paper was partially supported by my involvement in the Nature of Assertion: Consequences for Relativism and Fictionalism project (FFI2010-169049), the Vagueness and Physics, Metaphysics, and MetaMetaphysics project (FFI2008-06153), and the Persp-Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts project (CSD2009-00056). Many thanks to the DGI, MICINN, and the Spanish Government for supporting these projects.