Thinking animals, disagreement, and skepticism
According to Eric Olson, the Thinking Animal Argument (TAA) is the best reason to accept animalism, the view that we are identical to animals. A novel criticism has been advanced against TAA, suggesting that it implicitly employs a dubious epistemological principle. I will argue that other epistemological principles can do the trick of saving the TAA, principles that appeal to recent issues regarding disagreement with peers and experts. I conclude with some remarks about the consequence of accepting these modified principles, drawing out some general morals in defending animalism.
KeywordsAnimalism Persons Disagreement Live skepticism
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for comments. I am especially indebted to Tony Brueckner for his helpful comments on an earlier draft and for our many discussions on these issues.
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