Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 3, pp 791–795 | Cite as

Infinitism, finitude and normativity

Article

Abstract

I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections.

Keywords

Infinitism Finite-mind objection Epistemic normativity Epistemic justification Peter Klein Adam Podlaskowski Joshua Smith 

References

  1. Alston, W. (1989). Epistemic justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Audi, R. (1993). The structure of epistemic justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Bergmann, M. (2007). Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification? Philos Stud, 134(1), 19–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Cohen, S. (1999). Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons. Philos Perspect, 13, 57–89.Google Scholar
  5. Cohen, S. (2005). Knowledge, speaker and subject. Philos Q, 55(219), 199–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. DeRose, K. (2009). The case for contextualism: knowledge, skepticism, and context, vol 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Fantl, J. (2003). Modest infinitism. Can J Philos, 33(4), 537–562.Google Scholar
  8. Klein, P. (2005a). Infinitism is the solution to the regress problem. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology. Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  9. Klein, P. (2005b). Infinitism’s take on justification, knowledge, certainty, and skepticism. Veritas, 50(4), 153–172.Google Scholar
  10. Klein, P. (2007a). Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning. Philos Stud, 134(1), 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Klein, P. (2007b). How to be an infinitist about doxastic justification. Philos Stud, 134(1), 25–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Leite, A. (2004). On justifying and being justified. Philos Issues, 14, 219–253.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Podlaskowski, A. C., and Smith, J. A. (2009) Infinitism and epistemic normativity. Synthese. doi:10.1007/x11229-009-9654-1.
  14. Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Turri, J. (2009a). On the regress argument for infinitism. Synthese, 166(1), 157–163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Turri, J. (2009b). An infinitist account of doxastic justification. Dialectica, 63(2), 209–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Turri, J. (2010). Foundationalism for modest infinitists. Can J Philos, 40(2), 275–283.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCandada

Personalised recommendations