Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 3, pp 763–781 | Cite as

On fineness of grain

Article

Abstract

A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose. Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated. An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objections to the effect that the account individuates propositions too finely are raised and responses to the objections are provided. It is also shown that theories that try to individuate propositions less finely have serious problems.

Keywords

Propositions Propositional attitudes Possible worlds Structured propositions 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Karen Lewis and Kent Bach for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Ofra Magidor for helpful discussion. A version of this paper was delivered at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco on March 31, 2010. My thanks to the audience for helpful discussion.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyRutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

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