Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer
A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations.
KeywordsIndicative conditionals Epistemic modals Modalised conditionals Suppositional view
The present material has been presented at the workshop Phlox in Flux in Berlin 2011. Many thanks to all the participants for their helpful comments. In writing this article, I have benefited from partial funds by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for the project CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 CSD2009-00056 on Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts (PERSP) and for the project FFI2009-13436, I+D+i programme, on Semantic Content and Context Dependence.
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