Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 2, pp 527–537 | Cite as

Agent-neutral deontology

Article

Abstract

According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook View.

Keywords

Consequentialism Deontology Agent-relative Agent-neutral Constraint Axiology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Ethics in Society, Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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