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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 1, pp 251–269 | Cite as

Pleading ignorance in response to experiential primitivism

  • Raamy Majeed
Article

Abstract

Modal arguments like the Knowledge Argument, the Conceivability Argument and the Inverted Spectrum Argument could be used to argue for experiential primitivism; the view that experiential truths aren’t entailed from nonexperiential truths. A way to resist these arguments is to follow Stoljar (Ignorance and imagination. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) and plead ignorance of a type of experience-relevant nonexperiential truth. If we are ignorant of such a truth, we can’t imagine or conceive of the various sorts of scenarios that are required to make these arguments sound. While I am sympathetic to this response, in this article I will argue that we have good reason to believe that this particular ignorance hypothesis is false.

Keywords

Ignorance hypothesis Qualia Zombies Conceivability Consciousness Panpsychism Ramseyan humility Epistemic gap Physicalism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The School of Philosophical and Historical InquiryThe University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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